Hist 381 JAPAN'S DECISION TO GO TO WAR
Why do countries elect to commit military troops, human lives, and vast economic resources to war?
A) they want to gain something—territory, access, control, prestige.
B) they perceive their national
security—their very existence—is threatened.
Certainly, Americans all know that Japan launched a daring aerial bombardment of the Pacific Fleet Naval Base at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, hours before Japan's official declaration of war was delivered. So, it went down in history as a "sneak attack" and became known as the "Day of Infamy"
But why? Why did Japan do that?
Part of the answer to that question lies in Japan's decision to launch a full scale invasion of China in July, 1937. It was not as though Japan formally declared war against another state, China.
As McCclain puts it, it was a case of Japan "Sliding into War." Particularly, in Ch. 12, “A Period of National Emergency,” we can see from the first three section headings how McClain wants to narrate the story of Japan’s “Road to War.”
He starts with “The Manchurian Incident,” proceeds to “The Revolutionary Right and Terrorism and Home,” and then to a section called “Going It Alone.” Which basically point us to three tightly interwoven strands of historical interpretation:
1. The role of Japan’s military aggression abroad,
2. The rise of a violently inclined right wing at home, and then,
3. The decision to “go it alone” in terms of abandoning international law and organizations (like the League of Nations) and existing treaty obligations (in particular, the Washington Naval Treaties System dating from 1921-1922).
Of course, there are other Factors. A revealing part of McClain’s narrative is a section on “The Demise of Party Government.” He has some interesting statistics. When PM Inukai was assassinated in May of 1932, he was not succeeded by the head of the Seiyûkai party, which is what would have happened in “normal times,” because it was the party with a majority of seats in the Diet. Instead, retired Navy Admiral Saitô Makoto was appointed Prime Minister signaling an end to the era of party government.
During the era of party government, which stretched back to 1912 and the beginnings of Taishô Democracy, when cabinets had been consistently headed by a Prime Minister chosen from one of the two main political parties (remember “Imperial Democracy”?). Between 1924-32, there had been 7 cabinets and the average number of cabinet ministers with party affiliations was 8.7 out of the 12 top cabinet positions. Between 1932-1949, there were 8 more cabinets in which NO party politician served as PM, and the average number of ministers chosen from the civil and military bureaucracy (i.e., non-party ministers) was 9.9 out of 13 cabinet portfolios.
More importantly, the party politicians who did serve were increasingly isolated from the inner circle of policy makers; none were to be a part of the “5 Minister Conferences” which brought together the most important cabinet ministers, the Foreign, Finance, Army, Navy and the PM, So, basically, we are talking about leadership groups that did not incorporate the voices of the elected representatives of the people of Japan. Might Japan have acted differently if more would have been heard from elected civilian officials?
The next topic McClain pursues is “Reigning in Political Discourse,” which explores how the voices of liberals, progressives, and leftists were systematically suppressed. People who stood up to be counted in the 1920s like Yoshino Sakuzô, Minobe Tatsukichi, economist Kawakami Hajime, proletarian writers like Kobayashi Takiji who was murdered by police in 1933—stalwarts of the Taishô years, who were hounded, oppressed, and became either silenced or discouraged.
As Table 12.4 shows (p. 429) starting with the round up of 3,426 Leftists by PM Tanaka Giichi on March 15, 1928, another 38,000 more were arrested between 1931-1934. Leftist proletarian writer Kobayashi Takiji, famous for his story about the thwarted strike attempt by workers aboard a crab cannery vessel, was arrested in 1933 and died later the same day from the beatings and torture he endured.
So, there is hardly any other way to construe it: these were very tough times for individuals who held alternative views of the world and of society. The range in which they could operate was being seriously constricted year by year. As Japan became increasingly involved in military expansion and a war of aggression in neighboring China, the calls for loyalty and obedience to the Throne drowned out most other voices. This was a war that the government claimed was driven by a desire to have "stability" on Japan's neighboring continent.
But the problem was, with the rise of two competing movements, the Nationalist Army under Jiang (Chiang) Kaishek and his Guomindang party, and the CCP--the Chinese Communist Party--under Mao Zedong, there was anything but stability. Japan was fearful of the chaos and breakdown that might accompany a civil war. The US was supporting Jiang and supplying him with arms and equipment. They encouraged his standing up to Japan which Jiang tried to do. As Japan grew frustrated, they refused to even recognize Jiang or deal with him.
The US had vigorously denounced the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Japan's invasion of China as a compromise of China's sovereignty. In fact, the US had been following a "non-recognition" policy since Japan had launched the Manchurian Incident six years earlier, in September 1931, in which the Kwantung Army had taken over first the city of Mukden, then the whole region of Manchuria which it transformed into a "puppet state" called Manchuguo in 1932.
An architect of the Incident, as McClain points out, (407ff) was a Colonel, Ishiwara Kanji, who developed his ideas while teaching at the Army Staff College, and was later assigned to the field with the Kwantung Army. Ishiwara possessed an apocalyptic vision of the future, including the comng of a total war, with all the new merging techologies including air power, poison gases, tank batallions, etc. He saw the US as the emerging Pacific Power with whom Japan would have to contend while Japan represented the most advanced, the "leading nation" in Asia. Some kind of Armageddon type of clash loomed as inevitable in his eyes. BTW, he was also a Nichiren Buddhist which also seemed to foretell the coming of a great clash of civilizations way back in medieval times.
In spring 1931, Ishiwara was working with younger officers, convincing them that the Kwantung Army had to take unilateral action and occupy Manchuria even without authorization from the civilian governmetn at home. They started with a plot to elminate warlord Zhang Zuolin who controlled terriotories North of the Great Wall (i.e., Manchuria) so they blew up his train and assassinated him. This was the military acting independently, on its own; but they beleived they were carrying out a sacred mission. His son, Zhang Xueliang succeeded his father, though, and he would not trust nor cooperate with the Japanse.
Next, they set explosives on the South Manchurian Railway (built by Japan) and claimed it was Chinese bandits. They took this as a pretext to enter Mukden and then occupy ALL of Manchuria. Colonel Doihara declared himself head of an mergency committee to govern Mukden, effectively detaching the whole province from Chinese control.
The government at home tried to contain the incident and get the army to promise not to enlarge the theater of conflict...but the reality was the Army did not face sanctions so it was not discouraged from acting autonomously.
They installed the last Manchu Emperor, Henry Puyi, as the monarch, a plan hatched by Colonel, Doihara, known as "the Lawrence of Manchuria (at the end of the war, he was tried by the International Tribunal, accused of crimes against humanity, convicted and hanged). In this new puppet state of Manchuguo, Japanese "advisers" occupied key positions in the military, police and civilian government so virtually "ran" the new state.
The US and many other nations refused to recognize Manchuguo as a legitimate state. The Lytton Commission appointed by the League of Nations had investigated the Manchurian Incident and in 1932 concluded that it was a fabricated incident engineered by the Japanese military to use as an excuse to invade and take over Manchuria. When the membership voted to accept the Lytton Commission's findings in 1933, Japan dramatically withdrew from the League of Nations--beginning a "going-it-alone" odyssey. For Japan, it is usually held that WWII was the Fifteen Year War that Japan began in 1931 with the Manchurian Incident.
Why did Japan choose this route?
Japan wanted the Great Powers to recognize that it had special interests in East Asia -- it was the most industrialized, most advanced and most stable power in the area; it alreadey controlled Taiwan and Korea as colonies, and was concerned about the rise of Communist forces in China. When the Powers would not grant Japan a "Monroe Doctrine" style special interest in East Asia, Japan felt that the Powers would never play fair with Japan and they decided to operate autonomously. For that, they would need to control territory and natural resources in both East and Southeast Asia. They began to see the ABCD Powers -- America, Britain, China and the Dutch (Indonesia, oil, tin, rubber, etc.) -- as having a "stranglehold" on Japan. So, in Japanese eyes, the war was about liberating Asia from western colonial powers.
In the meantime, at home, the Japanese were extremely adept at mobilizing its populace for war in part by repressing and jailing most of the liberal and progressive voices, but also by inculcating a Particularistic Ideology about the uniqueness of Japan in schools and throughout many other dimensions of the social order.
We think about the the Meiji Constiotution of 1889 first; obviously, it locates sovereignty in the person of the emperor. There is also, around the same time, the issuance of Imperial Rescript on Education, the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, and the Peace Preservation Law as expressions of this form of particularism. In fact, the PPL og 1925 declares that:
Article I: Anyone who organizes a group for the pupose of changing the national polity (国体 kokutai) or of denying the private property system, or anyone who knowingly participates in said group shall be sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment not exceeding ten years. An offense not actually carried out shall also be subject to punishment.
Under this kind of framework then--what we might call "Imperial Democracy," opportunities for opposition were limited. As a result, there was much support at home and only very limited resistance. How did this come about? Was Japan's brand of nationalism especially intense brand or virulent? Was it different in kind from others? How do we as historians tell the story?
As George Wilson pointed out with the story of the Meiji Restoration, there were multiple actors and historical agents, and a variety of circumstances that contributed to Japan’s decision-making. Recall the observation about Plural Elites under the Meiji Costitution:
--Genro, or Elder Statesmen,
--Sat-Cho samurai who led the Meiji Restoration and their "descendants,"
--Political Party Leaders,
--Heads of large Financial Conglomerates or Zaibatsu,
--Civilian Bureaucrats,
--the Military with its Autonomous access to emperor,
--the elected Diet members,
--the appointed members of the Upper House, etc.
Whoever played the dominant role in this mix chould shift around with changing circumstances.
Sometimes, the "people," in the form of protests, labor organization, strikes, disruptions, even riots, etc., had their impact.
And the military could be an important force: orginally, the top members of the General Staff, Army Generals and Navy Admirals, but eventually other, more junior officers, became involved in political or ideological activities.
One simplistic scenario that existed was that Japan somehow went mad; decision makers lost control of their senses; they were crazy, sword wielding maniacs who viciously invaded other countries and hurt and oppressed other people. It was never that simple, but a generation of American historians writing on Japan who witnessed the Vietnam War came to realize that sometimes, the “best and the brightest” leaders are capable of making bad decisions which snowball and eventually may result in very bad things. You don’t have to be crazy to make bad decisions. Many prewar Japanese decision-makers were intelligent, well-educated, professionally trained civilians and military men who were patriotic and were looking after their country’s best interests.
Not everyone shared the visions and goals of a small minority of influential people who were willing to act on their on and force their superior officers and civilian cabinet leaders to accept the results of their actions. Once certain decisions were made, others decisions followed logically and many people just stayed the course and hoped to right the situation somnewhere down the line.
So what do we look at? Which thread in the narrative do we follow when we tell the story of Japan’s “Road to War,” “Japan’s decision to go to war,” to invade China and then Southeast Asian countries and precipitate a clash with the US and the UK? Most of the way we do this has at least a subtext which says, how did Japan make these bad decisions? Why did Japan do so many wrong, bad things?
Most American historians would argue that the Pacific War was the result of Japan’s aggression in East Asia after 1931—after the Manchurian Incident—which itself was an outgrowth of Japan becoming an Imperialist Power in the early 20th century. Up until 1931, Japan did not behave that differently from other Imperialist powers like US and GB. But after 1931, Japan left that framework behind.
They would probably also argue that there were multiple factors at work:
1. The rise of nationalism and ultranationalism—extreme rightwing views—at home.
2. The rise of nationalism and ultranationalism—extreme rightwing views—at home.
3. The actions of irresponsible military officers acting independently but never sufficiently disciplined for their actions.
4. There was a long term debate going back to Kaikoku v. Jo-i Axis, betwwen cooperation-orientned "Multilateralists" v. the more "Unilateralist," more autarkic view that stressed Jaapn's unique position in Asia and an inclination to go it alone.
More on this:
Military Historian S.C.M. Paine, in his book The Japanese Empire, makes an excellent point about how the two main options available to a country like Japan were to operate as Maritime Power or as a Continental one. Japan initially opted to function as a Maritime Power, to operate within the rules, the laws, the treaties, all the provisions of international and maritime law, that made it possible for countries to cooperate and prosper and to create wealth through international commerce. "The maritime world order," as he puts it, "is positive sum....Continental world orders are zero-sum at best and more typically negative sum, given all the fighting over spheres of influence. The motivating goals [for continental powers] are the confiscation of territory and wealth, but the wars entail damage to both, producing a negative sum. The continental paradigm characterized the preindustrial world where land was indeed the source of wealth because agriculture was the primary economic sector. After the Industrial Revolution, trade, industry, and service became the primary economic sectors, so land was no longer the ultimate source of power, money was. Money bought armies. And money came mainly from industry, commerce, and service." (178-179) Japan, he goes on to point out, was never geographically suited to become a great land power. It was an island country, an archipelago! Like Great Britain, it depended on international trade for resources and prosperity.
I might want to blend this argumment with the way that some historians, like Peter Duus, see the 1920s and 1930s as a contest, or a power-struggle, between what he calls "Multilateralists," largely civilian officials, diplomats, or navy officers who favored the maritime power model, versus the "Unilateralists," often associated with the Army and the orientation toward seeing Japan as a continental power with special needs and unique cultural connections to and interests in East Asia. In Duus' view, the "Multilateralist" viewpoint was associated with professionals in the diplomatic Corps, trained at University of Tokyo in Law, and many Naval Officers, who saw Japan as a Western-type of power; they accepted the rules of the "imperialist" game as laid down in various treaties and international organizations because they believed Japan could play by them successfully. They agreed with the US principle that exclusive spheres of influence in China were not a good idea, and they wanted to keep things in China open. They believed in diplomatic negotiations and they were confident in their ability to hold their own. And, yes, they saw Japan largely as a Maritime Power that depended on keeping trade and commerce going, keeping the shipping lanes open, and avoid conflict and war.
But "Unilateralists," tended to define Japan's interests in terms of a "Continental" (v. Maritime) power. They called for a "Positive Foreign Policy," by which they meant an activist, militarily engaged power on the continent. That is why they favored intervention in Chinese affairs with military power when necessary. To them, the "Multilateralist" approach resulted in "weak-kneed" foreign policy. They felt the diplomats would sacrifice National Harmony and well-being for International Harmony. They saw the "Multilateralists" as too close, to friendly with the U.S. and the U.K. Japan had "Special Interests" in China and they were not only material, economic interests. They had some long-standing spiritual obligation to uphold and protect China from the Powers. So, in this view, Japan was "unique," and unlike western powers; so Japanese "Particularism" (Natioanlism, Uniqueness, the Kokutai, the Emperor System, etc.) comes into play here, too. That is why it was justifiable to send troops into China to protect Japanese interstes when the Northern Expedition got underway. And Japan's interest in Manchuria was also special and unassailable. There was no negotiating on this in their view. Ultimately, the "Unilateralists" pushed Japan toward breaking away from international law and treaties, and "going it alone" as a continental power. But this had disastrous consequences. As Paine would say, "By the time it had finished, Japan had also violated all the rules of the maritime global order: it had walked out of the League of Nations - the primary rule-making body - ignored its treaty obligations, and attacked its trading partners, one of which was a dominant naval power. Once Japan lost its navy - a likely consequence of attacking the dominant naval power - it could not survive in either a continental or a maritime world. Without a navy it could not protect the home islands from blockade or attack and it soon lost its merchant marine, so it could not deliver troops and supplies to the theater or bring resources home. (179) Imperial Japan flourished in its earlier wars when it was cooperative, multilateralist and focused on its role as a maritime power; when it tried to be a unilateralist continental power, it perished. Literally, it went down in flames.
5. Waves of political assassinations, especially of party politicians and zaibatsu leaders, especially after 1931, so that the term “government by assassination” was coined by the foreign press.
This meant that there was political instability and lack of clarity on the domestic political scene.
7. No doubt, the World Depression of 1929 also played a role in creating feelings of anxiety and the conviction that drastic measures were called for. Who should best lead the country?
8. ARMY FACTIONALISM: The army was riddled by ideological and factional disputes.
9. FEB. 26, 1936 INCIDENT AKA the Ni-ni-roku (2-26) Jiken In 1936 there was a full-blown coup d'etat attempt to put the government in the hands of the military. It was led by Younger Officers who were inspired by 1911 writings of Kita Ikki. The coup failed but the waves of assassinations and coup attemots weakened and discredited governments led by Part heads that had been the defacto practice since 1912.
10. There was heightened rhetoric about Japan’s mission, Japan’s superiority in Asia, the need of an Asian Monroe Doctrine, the harmony of the 5 Races with Japan as the leading race.
11. The government used all the power at its disposal to: stifle dissent, suppress radical ideologies and mobilize civilian population to support war aims. It was also able to control individual Japanese lives from the top down to create an environment in which no one knew who might report someone else to the government, the "Thought Police" (Special higher Police or Tokko) for questionable loyalty;
12. They manipulated the myth of divine origins and the symbol of the emperor as sacred and inviolable to channel loyalties upward to the symbol of the state and successfully demand sacrifices from the populace.
So where do we start? Which actors or players should we look at?
I. One probably has to start by looking at the International Context, the Framework, in which the nation of Japan acted.
a. Japan was “opened” and forced into the world of imperialism by expanding western powers.
b. In 1885 a German adviser teaching at Japan’s War college argued that Korea was a “dagger pointed at Japan’s heart” and it should never fall under the control of a third party nation like Russia.
Yamagata had put forth the twin concepts of a line of sovereignty (national borders) and a line of advantage (surrounding buffer zone) which Japan needed to protect. (McClain pp. 290ff)
II. The international context
Basically, it was known as theWashington Conference Order established in 1921-22. WWI changed things and once Japan became a “Power,” a “player” in the game of thrones, the international community felt the need to change the rules. After all, the world order was changing rapidly.
a. THE CHINA SITUATION
In 1911 Imperial China fell in the Republican Revolution but no strong central government could replace the Manchus so China disintegrated into large territorial units governed by Military Strongmen called Warlords. Kita Ikki witnessed this event and began to think that Japan could benefit from a military coup which would uspend the constitution, the operations of the Diet, and basically create a classless society with the emperor on top, and everyone underneath him equal. No more privileged classes, just "pure Imperial rule." His writings were not necessarily influential in 1911-12--the era of "Taisho Democracy"--but would come to influence the Young Officers Movement in the 1930s and especially during the 2-26, 1936--what Japanese call the Ni-Ni-Roku jiken or Feb. 26 Incident--when there was a full-blown coup d'etat attempt to put the government in the hands of the military. (See below for more details)
b. 21 Demands
In 1915 during WWI Japan presented Yuan Shih-kai, leader of the Warlords, with “21 Demands” which were secret but Yuan leaked them. Five categories; last one would place Japanese advisers in high places, agree to purchase arms and munitions from Japan, allow Japan to construct RRs in China, etc. Exposed Japan as trying to gain special advantage in China so Japan untrustworthy?
c. RUSSIAN CONTEXT
In 1917 Czarist Russian replaced by a Marxist, Revolutionary USSR. Both of these factors contribute to a fluid situation which makes Japan nervous.
d. WWI Versailles peace Treaty
1919 terms of Versailles Treaty granting Japan the German Concession is Shandong touches off national humiliation day, demonstrations, boycotts, May Fourth Movement in which finally, Chinese from a variety of social classes are united by patriotism against Japan—students, workers, labor leaders, Marxists, merchants, businessmen, etc.—all take to the streets.
The "New Thought and Culture Movement" ensues and engulfed campuses and intellectuals calling for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy, new ideas, and the dominance of the Confucian worldview finally was challenged. The scene was more complicated for Japan now.
e. WWI removes Germany as a major player in Asia; France remains in Indo-Chine but is below pre-WWI levels; UK stable holding positions in China and Singapore.
The big new player on the Asian scene was the U.S. Japan represents the Old Imperialistic order; after all, they have just joined the game and they are playing by the rules they learned the hard way coming up.
Britain wants a new treaty structure because it is tied in a bilateral arrangement to Japan.
US has lofty ideas of ending diplomacy of Imperialism and secret agreements and wants to curtail or contain Japanese expansion into Manchuria and China out of fear Japan will limit access of other countries. US is all about Open Door since the 1890s = all powers have equal access to China; no spheres of influence.
Everyone, after WWI, has an interest in limiting international arms race.
The Washington Naval Treaty system:
--GB, Japan, US, France and Italy = main participants; 3 major treaties emerge:
1. Five Power Treaty = signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Italy was the cornerstone of the naval disarmament program. Japan preferred that tonnage be allotted at a 10:10:7 ratio, while the U.S. Navy preferred a 10:10:5 ratio. The conference ultimately adopted the 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 ratio in tonnage for aircraft carriers and battleships. US and GB had two ocean navies so they get greater tonnage; but in Pacific, Japan was on par. No US bases West of Hawaii; no UK bases East of Singapore. Cruisers not covered.
2. The Four Power Treaty: US, France, GB and Japan agree to consult with each other before taking action. Replaces Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 which would have obligated UK to join Japan v. US if it came to that. Heavily militarized and looking to expand its influence and territory, Japan had the potential to threaten U.S. colonial possessions in Asia and the profitable China trade.
3. Nine Power Treaty = internationalization of US Open Door Policy in China. Signatories were the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and China; all agreed they would respect the territorial integrity of China. The treaty recognized Japan's dominant position in Manchuria but otherwise affirmed the importance of equal opportunity for all nations doing business in the country. For its part, China agreed not to discriminate against any country seeking to do business there. Like the Four-Power Treaty, this treaty on China called for further consultations amongst the signatories in the event of a violation. As a result, it lacked a method of enforcement to ensure that all powers abided by its terms. For Japan, they saw their special position in Manchuria a recognized,but the US thought the principle of an Open China was being upheld. But there were no visible enforcement measures. This statement meant to reassure China that its territory would not be further compromised by Japanese expansion.
So overall impact was to stabilize status quo in Pacific and China; Japan could feel OK because special interests in Manchuria were recognizedin their interpretation. The US would take away the principle that nobody's terriotorial soveeignty would be further compromised. so the US and Japan probably had different interpretations of what the treaties accomplished.
III. Domestic Political Factors in Japan
1. Political parties have asserted their substantial role in decision-making. 1918 Rice Riots brought a pure party politician into office as PM; PMs are alternating between two parties: Seiyukai and Kenseikai depending who has majority of seats in Lower House of Diet.But there is no formal or legal sanction for this. The Meiji Constitution kept things vague whereby “elder statesmen” (the Genro) recommend to emperor who should be PM.
2. PLURAL ELITES
In reality, there are plural elites to contend with:
--political party leaders,
--civilian bureaucrats,
--military leaders with their special access to emperor and power to cripple a cabinet,
--financial leaders,
--landlords,
--radical young officers,
--Elder Statesmen,
--the Privy Council, etc.
In other words, a beast with One Head and many Bodies.
3. HOME MINISTRY
The role of a powerful Home Ministry that can reach down to the base of Japanese life and exert control and influence: Education, Village Youth Groups, Imperial Military Reservists' Association.
4. The Rise of extreme right wing ideologies, sometimes called “ultranationalism.” Secret societies, dreams of expansion on the continent, Japan’s sacred mission in the world to rescue Asia from Western Imperialism.
5. The Role of insubordinate younger officers who were in league with these visions and ideologies and who plotted coups d’etats, assassinations of politicians and financial leaders, believed themselves to be representing poor farmers, the working class, the masses, etc, saving them from corrupt party politicians and zaibatsu leaders.
The willingness to these men to take unsanctioned military action in China without approval of civilian cabinets and politicians back at home. E.g., Manchurian Incident 1931. Starting with one city, Mukden, Japanese Army soon expands into all of Manchuria and sets the stage for creation of a puppet state, Manchukuo. See https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/manchuria.htm
6. The May 1932 Blood Pledge Corps attack/assassination of government leaders. Party Politician Inukai Tsuyoshi murdered ending party rule.
7. Army Factionalism: Control Faction v. Imperial Way Faction.
Young Army Officers try to take over government with 1400 armed troops--in a nearly successful coup d'etat attempt though Showa Emperor did intervene and demand the rebellion--supposedly in his name--be put down. It did not mean that Pearl Harbor was inevitable after 2-26...but options were slowly sliding off the table and choices were narrowing. Details:
In the wee hours of 26 February 1936 (Showa 11), a group of young radical Army officers led some 1,400 troops under their command on a attack on the Prime Minister's residence and other buildings in Tokyo, killing Home Minister SAITO Makoto, Finance Minister TAKAHASHI Korekiyo, and Army Inspector General of Military Training WATANABE Jotaro. They also entrenched themselves in the Nagatacho and Miyakezaka Areas of central Tokyo, the hub of the country's government and military. This document was drawn up on the same day at an unofficial conference of the Military Councilors in the Imperial Palace by ARAKI Sadao, MASAKI Jinzaburo and others who were sympathetic with the rebellious officers, for the purpose of suppressing the uprising and returning them to their original divisions. It was passed along to the rebellious officers, but instead created confusion, as some changes were made in the wording of the text on the way. At one point, events seemed to be unfolding in the rebellious officers' favor, but when the Emperor made his will clear shortly thereafter, by firmly declaring that the revolt should be suppressed, the rebellion was quelled some three days later, 29 February 1936 (Showa 11).
The punishment handed down to the 2.26 Incident's instigators was severe, with the rebellious officers and those who influenced them ideologically KITA Ikki and NISHIDA Mitsugi, receiving death sentences. In the subsequent purge of the military, many officers, including those supporting the Imperial Way Faction, were transferred to the reserves, giving the control of the military to the more Control Faction. The terror spawned by the coup, furthermore, ended up casting a dark shadow on the political world, strengthening the voice of the military in the nation's political affairs.
The Yokusan (Imperial Rule Assistance) System
Voluntary service activities carried out by the Japanese Women's Patriotic Labor Association (Great Japan Women's League), Tokushima Prefecture Branch From "Aikoku, Kokubo Fujin Undo Shiryoshu. Vol.9"
As the wartime system become more entrenched in society, existing women's groups were put under control and reorganized in the name of reinforcing the mobilization of women. In February 1942 (Showa 17), the Patriotic Women's Association, the Great Japan National Defense Women's Association, the Great Japan Federated Women's Association, and other smaller groups were all merged into the Great Japan Women's Association. The merged group then joined the Taisei Yokusankai in May of the same year. Every adult woman in Japan, excepting the under twenty and unmarried, was forced to join, and the membership rolls reached 19 million in just one year. Even so, the executives working at the headquarters secretariat were all men.
In 1943 (Showa 18), the Great Japan Women's Association passed a resolution to energize all the women for the war effort enunciated four main principles for to this end: lift the morale of soldiers on the battlefield, adopt frugal lifestyles to conserve resources and win the war, raise production levels, and giving other kinds of support to the military.
National Mobilization Law was passed in 1938 (Showa 13) to deal with total war. The people were also enlisted to cooperate in the wartime framework, being organized through such systems as the Taisei Yokusankai and the Dai-Nippon Sangyo Hokokukai.
Meanwhile, the prolonged war caused an intense shortage of goods and materials in Japan, subjecting people's livelihoods to great hardships. As the end of the war approached, the main islands of Japan were also bombed heavily, causing tremendous damage.
In October 1937 (Showa 12), the Planning Bureau (Kikakuin) was established by the 1st KONOE Cabinet through a merger of the Resource Agency (Shigenkyoku) and the Planning Agency (Kikakucho). During the war, it served as the part of the government responsible for the promotion of the controlled economy, drawing up productivity enhancement plans and national mobilization plans in order to harness material and human resources. The 2nd Bureau of the Kikakuin, led by Bureau chief KASHIWABARA Hyotaro, was particularly responsible for formulating resource mobilization plans about the time the war begun. The worsening of the war situation caused Japan's marine transport capacity to decline, forcing a gradual retrenchment of the original plans.
In November 1943 (Showa 18), immediately after the 1944 (Showa 19) Revised Outline of Resource Mobilization Plan was drawn up, a reorganization of the government bureaucracy resulted in the absorption most of the Kikakuin's operations by the newly established Munitions Ministry, while the administration functions that had undertaken for important national policies were inherited by the Cabinet Counselor Office. In November 1944 (Showa 19), the General Planning Bureau was established, and placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister.
So, a question that I cannot help wondering about is whether things would have been different if the political parties had been stronger, the electorate, larger, the system more open and participative. If the PPL and the Home Ministry did not crack down so hard on ideas that were not wholly consistent with the Kokutai. If the Thought Police (Tokko) were not curtailing freedom of expression and assembly; if they were not censoring writers and hounding those with whom they disagree. Would Japan been able to pursue the same policies? If the people knew the truth, would they have supported the war effort?
IV. Some Key Historical Actors or Players:
1. Tanaka Gi'ichi PM 1927, also Home Minister; orchestrated suppression of leftists in March and April 1928; aggressive on China Policy.
2. Ishiwara Kanji, architecht of Manchurian Incident; See McClain pp. 407-409
3. Konoe Fumimaro, aristocrat, PM in 1937 during Japan's military campaign in China
4. General Tojo Hideki; leads Control Faction; succeeds Konoe as Japanese Prime Minister
I