Human Brain

STEVEN JAMES BARTLETT

Reflexivity

A Source-Book In Self-Reference

 

Edited and with an Introduction by Steven James Bartlett

 

Amsterdam: North-Holland / Elsevier Science Publishers, 1992

 

Reflexivity: A Source-book in Self-reference

 

This book is now out-of-print. At his request, the publisher has therefore provided the Editor with a reversion of all rights to the book. The Editor has chosen to make the volume freely available to readers as a copyrighted open access publication under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs license.

 

To download a free PDF copy of the complete volume (521 pages, approx. 13MB), click here.

Also available from RePub: Erasmus University Institutional Repository and PhilPapers.

 

 

From the Editor’s Introduction:

 

The Internal Limitations of Human Understanding

 

We carry, unavoidably, the limits of our understanding with us. We are perpetually confined within the horizons of our conceptual structure. When this structure grows or expands, the breadth of our comprehensions enlarges, but we are forever barred from the wished-for glimpse beyond its boundaries, no matter how hard we try, no matter how much credence we invest in the substance of our learning and mist of speculation.

 

The limitations in view here are not due to the mere finitude of our understanding of ourselves and of the world in which we live. They are limitations that come automatically and necessarily with any form of understanding. They are, as we shall see, part and parcel of any organization or ordering of data that we call information.

 

The consequences of these limitations are varied: As a result of them, hermeneutics cannot help but be hermetic; scientific theories of necessity are circumscribed by the boundaries of the ideas that define them; formal systems must choose between consistency and comprehensiveness; philosophical study, because it includes itself within its own proper subject matter, is forced to be reflexive in its self-enclosure. The fundamental dynamic shared by all forms of understanding testifies to an internal limitative keystone.

 

[For a complete copy of the Introduction, click here.]

 

CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The Role of Reflexivity in Understanding Human Understanding

            Steven J. Bartlett

 

PART I: SEMANTICAL SELF-REFERENCE

 

Paradox

            W. V. Quine

The Theory of Types

            Paul Weiss

A System which Can Define its Own Truth

            John Myhill

Heterologicality

            Gilbert Ryle

Some Reflections on Reflexivity

            Jørgen Jørgensen

On Non-translational Semantics

            R. M. Martin

Languages in which Self-reference Is Possible

            Raymond M. Smullyan

On a Family of Paradoxes

            A. N. Prior

A Note on Self-referential Statements

            Nicholas Rescher

Toward a Solution to the Liar Paradox

            Robert L. Martin

Presupposition, Implication, and Self-reference

            Bas C. van Fraassen

 

PART II: PRAGMATICAL SELF-REFERENCE

 

Pragmatic Paradoxes

            D. J. O’Connor

Mr. O’Connor’s “Pragmatic Paradoxes”

L. Jonathan Cohen

Pragmatic Paradoxes

            Peter Alexander

Fugitive Propositions

            Austin Duncan-Jones

Pragmatic Paradoxes and Fugitive Propositions

            D. J. O’Connor

Pragmatic Implication

            C. K. Grant

On Self-reference

            W. D. Hart

 

PART III: METALOGICAL SELF-REFERENCE

 

Self-reference in Philosophy

            Frederic B. Fitch

Universal Metalanguages for Philosophy

            Frederick B. Fitch

The Idea of a Metalogic of Reference

            Steven J. Bartlett

Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning

            Steven J. Bartlett

 

PART IV: COMPUTATIONAL SELF-REFERENCE

 

First Order Theories of Individual Concepts and Propositions

            J. McCarthy

Foundations of a Functional Approach to a Knowledge Representation

            Hector J. Levesque

A Computational theory of Belief Introspection

            Kurt Konolige

Languages with Self-reference, I: Foundations

            Donald Perlis

Languages with Self-reference, II: Knowledge, Belief, and Modality

            Donald Perlis

 

PART V: SELF-REFERENTIAL ARGUMENTATION

 

Cosmic Necessities

            Paul Weiss

On the Self-reference of a Meaning Theory

            Robert J. Richman

Argumentation and Inconsistency

            Henry W. Johnstone, Jr.

On Self-reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law

            Alf Ross

Self-referential Inconsistency, Inevitable Falsity, and Metaphysical Argumentation

            Joseph M. Boyle, Jr.

 

Author Index

Subject Index


ORDERING INFORMATION

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